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Abstract  
In the past arguments advocating the stemming of the ever arching 
reach of the misleading and deceptive conduct provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth)  by limiting damages awards to loss for 
which the contravenor is responsible, has fallen largely on deaf 
judicial ears. While some members of the judiciary have advocated a 
fair and just remedial response to misleading conduct based on 
responsibility of others, while accepting responsibility should play an 
integral part, have not been prepared to take this step without express 
legislative authority. The landmark High Court decisions of Henville v 
Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 and I&L Securities Pty Ltd v 
HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 
rather than dampening past criticisms added further impetus to the 
calls for legislative reform, which have been answered by the 
introduction of the concepts of contributory negligence and 
proportionate liability to the TPA. While the new provisions provide 
the courts with discretion to distribute liability for loss based upon 
responsibility, the judicial attitudes expressed in previous decisions 
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raise new questions about how the existing consumer protection policy 
of the TPA will interact with the new apportionment provisions. This 
article aims to examine how, in light of past judicial utterances, a fair 
and just remedial response will be maintained consistent with the 
consumer protection purposes of the Act. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1997, Seddon stated that “the courts take no account of the proportionate 
responsibility of the parties to an action based on misleading conduct”.1 Four years 
later the High Court provided further validation of this view when two opportunities 
to apportion loss between an claimant and contravener of s 52 presented themselves in 
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 (Henville) and I&L Securities 
Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd (2002) CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 (I&L 
Securities), where the majority of the court held that reduction of an injured party’s 
loss was not warranted under the express terms of s 82 of the TPA.2  The court 
reaffirmed its previous view that once it is established that the contravention of s 52 
materially contributed to the loss and damage caused, even though other causative 
factors may also have contributed to the loss, the claimant is entitled to the whole of 
the loss suffered without reduction.3 Justification of this result as a fair and just 
remedial response was founded both on the consumer protection policy of the Act and 
the fact no specific provision allowing the court to apportion responsibility for loss 
was present in s 82.  
 
Three years after these decisions global threats to the insurance market provided the 
necessary impetus for the Federal Government to pass the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (CLERP 
Act), which introduced changes to the TPA consistent with the economic reform 
                                                 
1  Seddon N, “Misleading Conduct the Case for Proportionality” (1997) 71 ALJ 71 at 71. 
2  Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 per Gummow, Hayne, and McHugh JJ; I&L 
Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and 
McHugh JJ. 
3  Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Reaffirming the 
view in previous decisions that the common law concept of causation should apply: Gates v City Mutual 
Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281. 
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agenda for the common law of negligence.4 The reform aims for some consistency 
across state and federal jurisdictions in relation to the apportionment of loss across all 
parties to a claim according to responsibility, including the plaintiff. To achieve this 
aim the concepts of contributory negligence5 and proportionate liability6 have been 
introduced to the assessment matrix for claims under s 82 (apportionment provisions). 
The introduction of these long awaited reforms to the compensation provisions of the 
TPA raises for consideration how, in light of previous judicial utterances, the fair and 
just remedial response referred to by the members of the High Court in I&L Securities 
(2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 and Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37, 
will be maintained when a court is required to interpret these new provisions or to 
exercise their discretion to apportion loss either between the claimant and respondent 
or between co-respondents.  
 
The thesis of this article is that previous judicial attitudes to the role of the consumer 
protection purpose of the TPA in the determination of contribution and apportionment 
will influence the approach taken by courts in the future interpretation and application 
of the new apportionment provisions. This article will endeavour to examine and 
analyse the likely influence previous judicial attitudes to the allocation of 
responsibility for misleading conduct will have on an interpretation of what at first 
blush appears to be a broad discretion to apportion both between claimant and 
respondent and co-respondents. In the writers’ view this analysis will reveal that the 
consumer protection policy of the Act adds a dynamic not present in other 
apportionment legislation (either for contributory negligence or proportionate 
liability) and presents a new challenge for maintaining the potency of the Act’s 
consumer protection purposes while giving effect to the clear distributive justice 
purpose of the new provisions. 
  
                                                 
4  The Federal Government released a “Report Card” on the tort law reform process in which 
Assistant Treasurer Mal Brough claims insurance premiums were dropping after institution of the 
reforms. A copy is available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=&ContentID=971. 
5  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82(1B) which gives the court a discretion to reduce the 
damages payable to the claimant where the court considers it just and equitable having regard to any 
loss caused by the failure of the claimant to take reasonable care. 
6  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 87CB-87CI allow the court to apportion liability between 
concurrent wrongdoers where a claim for compensation under s 82 arises from the contravention of s 
52. 
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Before examining the interaction of the new apportionment provisions with the 
consumer protection policy of the legislation, the existing judicial attitudes to 
apportionment of loss for claims under the TPA and in particular the extent to which 
the consumer protection objectives and policies of the Act have influenced the 
outcomes will be examined.   
 
2. Previous influence of Consumer Protection Policy on compensation 
awarded under s 82 TPA  
 
The primary object of the TPA is clearly stated in s 2 of the Act: 
  
… to enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition 
and fair trading and provision for consumer protection. 
 
While it is readily accepted that the policy of the Act includes the promotion of fair 
trading and protection of consumers from a contravention of the Act, differing views 
have been voiced as to the remedial response that will achieve this policy in the 
context of s 82.     
 
Compensation can be awarded under s 82 of the TPA to a person who suffers loss and 
damage by reason of the misleading or deceptive conduct of another person.  
Although courts, including the High Court, have consistently rejected strict analogies 
between the common law and the remedial operation of s 82,7 it was accepted prior to 
the decisions in (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [140]; 182 ALR 37 (per McHugh J)  and I&L 
Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 (per Gleeson CJ, McHugh J), that the 
principles of causation and the measure of damages in tort for deceit were applicable 
to claims for misleading conduct (in the form of misrepresentation) under the TPA.8  
 
                                                 
7  Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 at [38], [103]; 158 ALR 333; Murphy v 
Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 388; 204 ALR 26. 
8 Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &B 
Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281. This general presumption does not preclude damages being calculated in 
accordance with the contractual measure for misleading or deceptive conduct where appropriate: refer 
to Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 410; Munchies 
Management Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 58 FCR 274; Wardley (Australia) Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 
175 CLR 514. 
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In both Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 and I&L Securities (2002) 210 
CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 a majority of the High Court reaffirmed previous decisions, 
holding that the common law concept of causation was applicable to damages claims 
under s 82.9 Consequently, once the claimant proved that the contravening conduct 
was a material cause of the loss or damage, the claimant was entitled to recover all 
losses even though other causative factors may also have contributed to the loss.10  
While all judges in Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 and I&L Securities 
(2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 agreed that the policy of the Act should play a role 
in the determination of the ultimate award, the majority11 and minority12 differed in 
their use of that policy. The following statement by McHugh J exemplifies the view 
of the majority in Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [140]; 182 ALR 37 (emphasis 
added): 
 
Nothing in the common law, in s 52 or s 82 or in the policy of the Act supports 
the conclusion that a claimant’s damages under s 82 should be reduced 
because the loss or damage could have been avoided by the exercise of 
reasonable care on the claimant’s part.  There is no ground for reading into s 
82 doctrines of contributory negligence and apportionment of damages.   
 
Similarly in I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1, McHugh J, again in the 
majority, stated that “the policy behind the legislation is furthered if the party whose 
conduct contravenes the legislation bears the entire loss” (at [104]). The clear 
intimation from the majority judgments is that the policy objective of fairness to 
consumers is not met by limiting the compensation payable to a claimant through the 
doctrine of contributory negligence.  
 
In contrast, the minority in both Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 and I&L 
Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 while accepting the application of the 
                                                 
9  Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &B 
Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281. 
10  The only circumstance in which a reduction of compensation may occur is where the 
unreasonable conduct of the claimant broke the chain of causation between the conduct and the loss. 
See Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [106]; 182 ALR 37 per McHugh J. 
11  Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; I&L Securities 
Pty Ltd (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Gaudron, Callinan 
JJ. 
12  Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 per Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J; I&L Securities Pty 
Ltd (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 per Kirby J. 
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concept of causation to s 82 considered that the policy of the Act justified a reduction 
in compensation. First, Gleeson CJ in Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [35]; 182 ALR 
37 stated that: 
 
Neither the purpose of the statute nor the justice of the case required that, 
having made representations which, in combination with the erroneous cost 
estimates of the appellants, induced the appellants to enter into the 
development project, the respondents should be required to underwrite all the 
losses, regardless of how they came to be incurred. 
 
A similar sentiment is conveyed in the strong dissent of Kirby J in I&L Securities 
(2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1. His Honour, who was not a member of the court in 
Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37, considered that there was no reason in 
the language or policy of the Act for a respondent to pay compensation for loss not 
directly caused by their conduct but caused by the conduct of another person, 
including the claimant. Interestingly, like the majority in Henville (2001) 206 CLR 
459; 182 ALR 37, Kirby J rationalised his conclusions on the need to uphold fairness 
for consumers as one of the underlying policies of the Act (at [178]): 
 
If the view is taken, as Callinan J puts it (correctly in my opinion), that the 
outcome favoured by the majority is “unfair … [and] unlikely to have been 
intended by the legislature” (at [211]) the mind of a judge naturally searches 
for an alternative construction that avoids such an affront to justice. Where 
alternative constructions are available, conventional rules of statutory 
interpretation encourage judges to attribute to parliament a purpose to produce 
a just outcome rather than one that causes unfairness and unjust over-
compensation at the price of another. The principle of consumer protection 
reflected in the Act is one of fairness to consumers. Except to the extent 
expressly provided in terms of penalties and punishments, it is not one of over-
compensation and unjust excess. Providing windfall gains to litigants is not 
part of the scheme of the legislation. That scheme contemplates that all should 
be responsible, but only responsible, for the damage that they cause. 
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Justice Kirby’s statement reflects a broader view of fairness to consumers that 
includes fairness to the community at large by ensuring individuals are only 
responsible for the loss that they cause. This divergence from the view of the majority 
underpinned Kirby J’s conclusion that the claimant should bear some of the loss.  
 
Not surprisingly the consumer protection purpose of the TPA has played a significant 
role in shaping the approach of the High Court in its interpretation of s 82 of the Act. 
In the context of s 82, the consumer protection policy of the Act has been fulfilled by 
awarding claimants the whole of their loss without reduction for a failure to take 
reasonable care of their own interests.  Prior to the introduction of the new 
apportionment provisions the High Court has only been concerned with one central 
policy of consumer protection. The introduction of an express legislative authority to 
apportion loss between the claimant and a wrongdoer challenges the primacy of the 
consumer protection policy;13 the primary object of the Act remains unchanged 
despite the amendment to s 82.  Therefore, after the amendments it will be necessary 
for the court to balance two competing policies, first the overall policy of consumer 
protection and secondly, the policy of distributive justice which requires every party 
to bear responsibility for their own part of the loss. While the approach of Kirby J in 
I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1 indicates that rationalisation of the 
two policies is possible there are situations, particularly in the area of proportionate 
liability, where giving equal effect to each policy may prove challenging.  
 
3. “Just and Equitable” Apportionment where Claimant Fails to “Take 
Reasonable Care” – s 82(1B) 
Section 82(1B) provides, in paraphrase, that in a claim for contravention of s 52 for 
economic loss or property damage under s 82, where loss is suffered partly as a result 
of the “claimant’s failure to take reasonable care”, the damages should be reduced to 
the extent the court thinks “just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share of 
responsibility for the loss or damage”. An apportionment should not be made however 
where the respondent either intended to cause the loss or fraudulently caused the loss. 
 
                                                 
13  As suggested previously in Schmidt P, “Misleading Contribution” (2003) 11 TPLJ 134 at 146, 
the introduction of an express discretion to apportion is contrary to the consumer protection objective of 
the TPA. 
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As highlighted by the examination of previous authorities the consumer protection 
policy of the TPA has in the past played a pivotal role in the determination of:  
 
• the meaning of certain words in s 82 such as “by”, thereby setting the 
application and scope of the section; and  
• the measure of compensation awarded by using common law principles as a 
guide and altering their application within the context of the TPA to accord 
with the policy of the Act.  
 
It is therefore proposed to limit the consideration of the impact of the consumer 
protection policy on an interpretation of s 82(1B) to two particular aspects, first, the 
likely scope of s 82(1B) and secondly, the likely approach to assessing the amount of 
the reduction of damages under the section.  
 
3.1 Threshold requirements for operation of s 82(1B)  
Any exercise of the court’s power to reduce damages for the conduct of the claimant 
must be preceded by a consideration of the requirements of the section. It is clear 
from s 82(1B) that its operation is limited in the following ways: 
 
• The claim must be for property damage or economic loss caused by a 
contravention of s 52 of the TPA; 
• The claim for compensation must be made under s 82(1) of the TPA; 
• The loss must be suffered partly as a result of the claimant’s failure to take 
reasonable care; and  
• The wrongdoer did not intentionally or fraudulently cause the loss. 
 
These requirements raise several situations in which a court may need to resort to a 
consideration of the consumer protection policy of the Act. It is not intended to 
consider every aspect of construction which may arise under s 82(1B) or to set out 
every possible practical difficulty or issue of interpretation which may arise, this has 
been done by other commentators.14 The purpose of this exposition is to put forward 
                                                 
14  McDonald B, “Proportionate Liability in Australia: The devil in the detail” (2005) 26 ABR 29; 
Seddon N, “Shared responsibility for misleading conduct” (2004) 1 Civil Liability 29; Christensen S, 
“Sharing Responsibility for Misleading Conduct: Is Professional Liability no Longer ‘All or Nothing’” 
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for debate the situations in which the court may need to resort to the consumer 
protection policy of the Act and how that policy, in light of the competing objectives 
of the new provisions, may influence the decision of the court. This will be done 
through posing a series of questions. 
 
Can s 82(1B) be avoided by bringing a claim for compensation under s 87 of the 
TPA or a claim for a contravention of another section of the Act such as s 53 or s 
53A? 
 
No rationale is apparent for limiting apportionment to claims arising out of s 52, 
especially as many actions are argued before a court in the alternative. If the 
misleading or deceptive conduct of the respondent is a contravention of s 52, but is 
also a misleading representation in breach of s 53A, can the claimant avoid a 
reduction of their compensation under s 82(1B) by only claiming under s 53A? 
Alternatively, are the provisions avoided by only claiming a remedy for a 
contravention of s 52 under s 87 of the TPA? No guidance is evident in the 
explanatory memorandum accompanying the amendment in the CLERP Act and the 
stated objects of the CLERP Act only refer in detail to the reasons for incorporating 
proportionate liability within the TPA and the Corporations Act. 
 
Left with little external guidance, a court would be clearly justified in refusing to 
apportion compensation granted under s 87 where the claimant caused some of the 
loss through their negligence. This accords with the clear wording of s 82 and is 
justifiable on the basis a strict reading protects consumers from the misleading 
conduct of others by limiting the circumstances in which compensation may be 
reduced. This however, may leave a situation not unlike that in the aftermath of Astley 
v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 161 ALR 155 where alternative claims in tort and 
contract for the same loss resulted in different amounts of compensation, due to the 
inability of a court to reduce the contract claim on the basis of contributory 
negligence. Will this result in some judges favouring a broader approach that gives 
due regard to what can be assumed was the intended purpose of introducing s 82(1B), 
each party should bear a just and equitable proportion of the loss they are responsible 
                                                                                                                                            
(2004) 19 APLB 37; O’Neill J, “Proportionate Liability under the TPA: Some Practical Issues” (2004) 20 
TPLB 79. 
 10
for? It is certainly possible that Kirby J, having embraced the notion that avoiding 
over-compensation to consumers is already reflected in the policy of the Act,15 may 
prefer to overlook conventional rules of statutory interpretation to avoid what could 
be argued is an unfair or unjust outcome. If you claim under s 82 your damages are 
reduced but if you fortuitously claim under s 87 no reduction for damages will be 
made. 
 
In the writers’ view the most likely initial judicial reaction to the section will be the 
restriction of it operation to claims under s 82 for compensation following a 
contravention of s 52. 
 
Will a failure to investigate the veracity of the representations be a “failure to take 
reasonable care” that “results in” a loss to the claimant?  
 
Section 82(1B)(b) provides that a reduction in the compensation awarded will only 
occur where the claimant “suffered the loss or damage as a result partly of the 
claimant’s failure to take reasonable care”. This raises two questions. First, does the 
phrase “as a result of” imply a need to consider the causal effect of the claimant’s 
conduct as a threshold issue? Secondly, what conduct will amount to a failure to take 
reasonable care? Answering these questions requires a consideration of the possible 
discretionary and policy considerations that may influence the decision of a court. 
 
These questions can be explored through consideration of a common situation in 
which a wrongdoer may allege the claimant failed to take reasonable care. In Collins 
Marrickville Pty Ltd v Henjo Investments Pty Ltd (1987) 72 ALR 601 the respondent 
and claimant entered into a contract for the purchase of a restaurant. The respondent 
failed to disclose to the claimant buyer of the business that despite the fact 128 
patrons existed in the restaurant and bar the premises were only licensed for 84 seats. 
The claimant could have easily discovered this fact if their solicitor had competently 
performed their instructions.  These facts are indicative of many other cases where a 
person misled by the conduct of another could have, if investigations had been made, 
discovered the misleading nature of the representations. Prior to the commencement 
                                                 
15  I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [178]; 192 ALR 1. 
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of s 82(1B), it was quite clearly held in numerous decisions that the fact the claimant 
failed to undertake proper inquiries, which would have revealed the misleading 
conduct, was irrelevant to the measure of loss recoverable provided the claimant 
relied upon the misleading conduct.16  The question is whether following the 
introduction of s 82(1B) a failure to investigate the truth of a representation should 
amount to a failure to take reasonable care and therefore reduce the damages 
recoverable by the claimant. 
 
Failure to take reasonable care 
Consistent with the previous judicial approach to interpretation of the TPA,17 the 
concept of contributory negligence both at law and under the apportionment 
legislation is likely to be used as a guide in any consideration of the meaning of 
“failure to take reasonable care” under s 82(1B)(b).  The term “contributory 
negligence” refers to a failure of a plaintiff to act reasonably, as noted in Joslyn v 
Berryman (2002) 214 CLR 552 at [16]; 198 ALR 137 by McHugh J: 
 
At common law, a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when the 
plaintiff exposes himself or herself to a risk of injury which might reasonably 
have been foreseen and avoided and suffers an injury within the class of risk to 
which the plaintiff was exposed. 
 
Originally under the common law, a finding of contributory negligence was a 
complete defence to a claim in negligence as it was seen to break the chain of 
causation between the plaintiff’s damage and the breach of duty by the defendant. 
Therefore, if a plaintiff failed to take reasonable care of their own safety or interests 
and this failure was either the cause of the loss or the loss suffered was aggravated, a 
defendant could allege contributory negligence to defeat the claim. The common law 
rule of contributory negligence was modified with the introduction of the 
                                                 
16  Sutton v AJ Thompson Pty Ltd (In liq) (1987) 73 ALR 233, 240; Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v 
Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 39 FCR 546, 558; Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd 
(1990) 26 FCR 112, 138; Gentry Brothers Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown and Associates Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 
41-460, Henville (2001) 206 CLR 549; 182 ALR 37; I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1; cf 
Webster v Havyn Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 227. 
17  Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 at [38], [103]; 158 ALR 333; Murphy v 
Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 388; 204 ALR 26. 
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apportionment legislation18 and modern contributory negligence is no longer 
technically a defence, but a tool by which a court may reduce the damages of the 
plaintiff.   
 
There are many common features between s 82(1B) of the TPA and the 
apportionment legislation.  Under each the first hurdle for a respondent alleging 
contributory negligence is establishing that the plaintiff was at fault, that is, failed to 
take reasonable care.  The phrase “reasonable care” denotes the use of an objective 
test in assessing the conduct of the plaintiff as it does when assessing the standard of 
care owed by a defendant. However, when considering the alleged negligent conduct 
of a plaintiff the courts often applied a more lenient standard.19 This leniency was 
noted by the Ipp Panel.  The Panel recommended that legislation specify that a 
plaintiff’s conduct was to be assessed according to the same objective standard as a 
defendant’s.20 The states have incorporated such a provision in their civil liability 
legislation.21 However, there is no equivalent provision in the TPA, thereby allowing 
a court to “objectively” assess a claimant’s conduct as it wishes.   A court may state 
that it is applying an objective test to determine whether the claimant’s conduct was 
reasonable in the circumstances, but import subjective characteristics of the plaintiff 
to enable a finding of either no contributory negligence or only a slight deviation from 
the standard of a reasonable person.  A finding of only a slight deviation would lead 
to a negligible reduction of damages due to the comparison of the culpability of the 
parties in assessing what reduction of damages would be just and equitable.22 
                                                 
18  See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9(1); Law Reform Act 1995 
(Qld), s 10(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; 
Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic,) s 26(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence 
and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4(1); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 102; Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 16(1). 
19  Fleming JG, The Law of Torts, 9th ed, Law Book Co, p 320; Caterson v Commissioner of 
Railways (1973) 128 CLR 99.  See Ipp DA, Cane P, Sheldon D, Macintosh I, Review of the Law of 
Negligence – Final Report, Treasury Dpt, Cth, October 2002 at [8.11] where Commissioner of Railways 
v Ruprecht (1979) 142 CLR 563 at 577-8 per Murphy J; Cocks v Sheppard (1979) 25 ALR 325; Watt v 
Bretag (1982) 56 ALJR 760; Pollard v Ensor [1969] SASR 57, Evers v Bennett (1982) 31 SASR 228 are 
cited as examples of where a lower standard of care was applied in respect of the plaintiff’s conduct. 
20  Ipp et al, n 19 at [8.11]-[8.13]. 
21  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5R; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 23; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA), s 44; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 23; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 5K; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), 
s 5K. There are no equivalent provisions in the legislation of the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory. 
22  It may be argued that courts considering the conduct of claimant in a s 52 claim already are 
predisposed to being more lenient.  Prior to the amendments when the conduct of the claimant was not 
relevant unless it broke the causal link between the misleading or deceptive conduct and the loss, a 
court’s assessment of the claimant’s conduct tended to be in favour of the claimant.  See for example 
Gardner Corporation Pty Ltd v Zed Bears Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 13. 
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The synergy of the “objective approach” with previous approaches to assessment of 
loss is evident in the majority view in Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 and 
I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1. These cases clearly advocate an 
approach that protects consumers from misleading conduct and ensures wrongdoers 
are responsible for the full amount of the loss caused.  As Gleeson CJ stated in 
Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [13]; 182 ALR 37: 
 
 It will commonly be the case that a person who is induced by misleading or 
deceptive representation to undertake a course of action will have acted 
carelessly, or will have been otherwise at fault, in responding to the 
inducement. The purpose of the legislation is not restricted to the protection of 
the careful or astute. Negligence on the part of the victim of a contravention is 
not a bar to an action under s 82 unless the conduct of the victim is such as to 
destroy the causal connection between contravention and loss or damage. 
 
Even members of the minority in I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1, 
who were in favour of reducing the compensation of the claimant, were not in favour 
of reducing compensation where the cause of the loss was the failure of the claimant 
to detect the misleading conduct. The conclusion that a claimant’s compensation 
should not be reduced where the failure to take reasonable care related to discovery of 
the misleading conduct has a strong grounding in the consumer protection policy of 
the Act.  Even Kirby J, intent on watering down the policy in favour of compensation 
grounded in culpability for loss, conceded that (at [182]): 
 
The result would have been different if the supposed separate cause of the 
appellant's loss or damage had been its failure to detect and correct the 
negligent valuation of the respondent. For such causes of loss, s 82 of the Act 
contemplates no diminution in the consumer's recovery from the party in 
contravention of the Act that has caused its loss or damage. The contravener is 
forbidden from asserting “You should not have believed me when I misled 
you”. 
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Clearly a subjective or policy consideration will be whether it was reasonable for the 
claimant to take steps to check the truth of the representations made by the 
wrongdoer. An alteration to the existing attitudes of the courts would seriously 
undermine the very operation of s 52 of the Act and allow contraveners of the section 
to blatantly disregard the required standards of behaviour imposed by the section by 
putting responsibility for discovering the truth of the statement back on to the injured 
party. In the writers’ view this is a situation in which the consumer protection policy 
of the Act is under threat if a reduction of compensation for this type of conduct is 
allowed.  
 
Beyond the situation were an injured party has failed to take reasonable steps to check 
the veracity of a statement, there are a range of situations in which an injured party 
may have failed to protect their interests, examples of which include: 
 
• Failing to take usual precautions or undertake usual searches in a purchase or 
lending transaction, such as occurred in I&L Securities where the financial 
institution failed to check the financial standing of the borrower.23 
• Failing to follow standard business and management practices by virtue of 
inexperience or incompetency after the purchase of a business induced by 
misleading conduct. 
 
While courts have justified their refusal to reduce compensation payable in these 
situations in the past by reference to the policy of the Act, it is likely that s 82(1B) 
will impact on this type of conduct in the future.  Unlike a failure by the injured party 
to discover the falsity of the misleading conduct, reduction of compensation for the 
failure of an injured party to undertake usual searches or inquiries related to the 
property but unconnected with the misleading statement does not strike at the core of 
the consumer protection objectives of the Act. Having said that however, a court is 
likely, as was done by the courts prior to the civil liability legislation, to find that 
certain characteristics of the claimant may be relevant when determining whether 
reasonable care was exercised by the claimant.  For example, an ordinary person 
                                                 
23  For similar situations in the purchase of a property refer to Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real 
Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112 where the buyer relied on a zoning certificate in the contract and 
statements in a brochure;  and Pratt v Latta [2001] FMCA 84. 
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entering into a contract to purchase an investment property could not be expected to 
have the same resources and knowledge as a person who is actually in the business of 
property investment. Therefore, the reasonable care that could be expected from 
someone with more experience in such matters would be of a higher standard.  This is 
evident in Gardner Corporation Pty Ltd v Zed Bears Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 13  where 
the claimant proved misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to the purchase of a 
franchise business and claimed for all losses, including losses which were not directly 
attributable to the respondent’s contravening conduct but due to the claimant’s failure 
to comply with franchisor guidelines and business mistakes. Applying the principles 
from Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37 and I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 
109; 192 ALR 1, Stetyler J awarded the full loss, reasoning that the conduct of the 
claimant was not “abnormal” and the decisions “were ordinary business decisions 
made in the course of the operation of the business by a person who was, and who 
was known to be, inexperienced in the running of a business of that kind” (at [78]). 
 
When will loss be “the result of” the failure to take care? 
The other factor which will also impact on the ramifications of a failure to take 
reasonable care is whether the loss is suffered as a result of that failure.  Under the 
common law, an apportionment will be made if the plaintiff’s conduct was the cause 
of the loss, increased the risk of injury or aggravated the damage.  For example, if it is 
alleged that the claimant failed to take reasonable care in ascertaining the correctness 
of any representations prior to entering into a contract, it would have to be proven that 
if such action had been taken they would not have entered into the contract or would 
not have entered to it on those terms.  If it is the conduct of the claimant after the 
transaction that is relevant, then it would need to be established that if they had acted 
reasonably the loss suffered would not be as great. 
 
Section 82(1B)(b)(i) requires the claimant to suffer the loss or damage “as a result 
partly of the claimant’s failure to take reasonable care”. It is relatively clear that the 
use of the phrase, “as a result of” imports a requirement for a causal effect between 
the failure and the loss suffered.  In Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 
175 CLR 514 when considering the use of the phrase “by conduct” in s 82, Mason CJ, 
Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ stated (at 525): 
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 “By” is a curious word to use.  One might have expected “by means of”, “by 
reason of”, “in consequence of”, or “as a result of”.  But the word clearly 
expresses the notion of causation without defining or elucidating it. 
 
In that case the court was of the opinion that the same approach to causation as 
identified in March v E&M Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 99 ALR 423 - one 
of commonsense, value judgments and policy considerations – should be applied to s 
82 (at 515-17 per Mason CJ; at 524 per Deane J; at 530-1 per McHugh J).  In March v 
E&M Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, McHugh J stated that questions of 
causation should be decided on “broad grounds of moral responsibility for the damage 
which has occurred” (at 531).  When considering the issue of causation, the Ipp Panel 
noted that: 24 
 
it is relevant to consider whether (and why) responsibility for the harm should 
be imposed on the negligent party, and whether (and why) the harm should be 
left to lie where it fell (that is, on the plaintiff). 
 
With the object of the TPA being consumer protection, this would be a relevant policy 
consideration when addressing the issue of whether the claimant’s loss was a result of 
their own failure to exercise reasonable care.  If a claimant has suffered loss due to 
misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 52, the purpose of the 
legislation is to compensate the claimant and to prevent such business practices.  
Therefore with this object in mind, when asked to consider whether the respondent 
should be held liable or the loss should remain with the claimant, the answer 
obviously will be that the respondent should be held liable if not for all of the loss, a 
substantial part of the loss. 
 
Will consumer protection policy influence the exclusionary provision for fraud and 
intent? 
 
The benefit to a wrongdoer of a reduced compensation award is lost where the 
conduct of the wrongdoer intentional or fraudulently causes the loss of the claimant. 
                                                 
24  Ipp et al, n 19 at [7.33]. 
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Under s 82(1B)(c) the question of whether the respondent intended to or fraudulently 
caused the loss or damage suffered is a threshold requirement for application of the 
section. No reduction of the award of damages will be made if the respondent 
intentionally misled or deceived the claimant and loss was suffered.  The construction 
given to these exclusionary requirements, is likely to impact on the future viability of 
claims under s 52 and secondly, the effectiveness of s 82(1B). Given that every 
claimant faced with an allegation of failure to take reasonable care will attempt to 
allege intention or fraud,25 thereby creating the platform for intention and deceit to 
become “central feature[s] of misrepresentation litigation”,26 what influence will the 
consumer protection policy of the Act have on the interpretation of these terms? 
 
First it should be noted that the introduction of intention and fraud as exceptions to 
the operation of the apportionment provisions ensures an alignment of s 82(1B) with 
the common law where contributory negligence cannot be claimed as a defence to an 
action for fraud27 or intentional torts, such as trespass.28 
 
Secondly, parallels are already accepted between the principles applicable in a claim 
for deceit and one for misleading conduct.29 For example McHugh J in Henville 
(2001) 206 CLR 459 at [135]; 182 ALR 37 held: 
 
Nor do I see any reason why the principles applicable in an action for deceit at 
common law should not be applied in the present case. The purposes of the 
Act include promoting fair trading and protecting consumers from 
contraventions of the Act. Those purposes are more readily achieved by 
ensuring that consumers recover the actual losses they have suffered as the 
result of contraventions of the Act. 
 
                                                 
25  A contrary view is expressed by McDonald that the fact that most insurance policies will not 
cover fraud may influence a claimant’s decision to allege it. McDonald, n 14 at 49. 
26  Watson J, “From Contribution to Apportioned Contribution to Proportionate Liability” (2004) 78 
ALJ 126 at 142. 
27  Alliance & Leicester BS v Edgestop Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1462; Standard Chartered Bank v 
Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Nos 2 and 4) [2002] 3 WLR 1547. 
28  Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 at 317 per Bray 
CJ. 
29  Refer to Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1. 
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As the congruency between the common law of deceit and misleading conduct is 
already accepted it is likely that most judges will consider the adoption of common 
law principles, including the definition of fraud,30 to be consistent with the consumer 
protection policy of the Act.  
 
An issue which clearly arises from s 82(1B)(c) is what will be required to prove a 
wrongdoer intended to or fraudulently caused the loss? The situation of silence as 
misleading conduct requires examination in this context. It is accepted that silence 
will be misleading where after consideration of all the circumstances it can be 
established there was a reasonable expectation that if a particular matter existed it 
would be disclosed.31 A crucial element of the test is that the respondent had 
knowledge of the fact not disclosed and deliberately failed to disclose it. 32 While the 
authorities require the silence to be intentional there is no discussion of whether the 
intent must also extend to an intention to cause loss by reason of the silence.33  This 
raises the significant question of whether an intention to mislead is the same as proof 
of an intention to cause loss? If it was accepted that one flowed from the other it 
would mean that in all cases of silence an intention to cause loss will follow from 
proof of misleading conduct.   Therefore in all cases of misleading conduct by silence 
no reduction would be made for the claimant’s failure to exercise reasonable care. 
Would this be justified by the policy of the TPA? The inference from a finding that a 
person has engaged in misleading conduct through silence is that the information was 
withheld deliberately with knowledge that this withholding would induce the claimant 
to act in a certain way; usually being the entry into a contract34 or payment of 
money.35 Compensation is payable to the claimant once it is proved that the silence 
caused the loss of the claimant. It is not a difficult step to then conclude the 
respondent intended, by the deliberate withholding of information, to cause loss to the 
                                                 
30  A fraudulent representation is generally define as a representation where the defendant knew it 
to be false, did not believe it to be true or was recklessly indifferent as to whether it was true or false: 
Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 360. 
31  Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 110 ALR 608; Metalcorp Recyclers Pty Ltd v Metal 
Manufactures Ltd [2003] NSWCA 213 at [14]. 
32  Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 77 at 84; 
Costa Vraca Pty Ltd v Berrigan Weed & Pest Control Pty Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 714 at 722. 
33  Johnston Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 453; Costa Vraca Pty Ltd v 
Berrigan Weed and Pest Control Pty Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 714 at 722. 
34  Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd [1996] ATPR (Digest) 46-159; Hai Quan Global 
Smash Repairs v Ledabow Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1224. 
35  Metalcorp Recyclers Pty Ltd v Metal Manufactures Ltd [2003] NSWCA 213. 
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claimant particularly where loss is the obvious result of entry into the contract or the 
payment of money.36 
 
Given the policy of the Act and the fact misleading conduct by silence is not easily 
proved, it is likely a court will conclude that an intention to cause loss follows 
naturally from an intention to induce a contract through misleading conduct.  
 
3.2 Determining responsibility for loss – How broad is the discretion? 
Once a court determines that s82(1B)(a), (b) and (c) have been satisfied, the section 
provides that the loss or damage is “to be reduced to the extent to which the court 
think just and equitable”. A primary issue of relevance to the consumer protection 
policy of the Act is, “How will a court determine relative responsibility between a 
failure to take reasonable care and misleading conduct?”  The difficulty of drawing a 
comparison between conduct which is misleading or deceptive and conduct which is 
careless has already been noted by Hayne, Gummow and Gaudron JJ in I&L 
Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [59]; 192 ALR 1. Section 82(1B), like the 
equivalent state apportionment legislation, is general and does not restrict the exercise 
of the court’s discretion to particular factors. The only guideline for the court is that 
compensation to the claimant may be reduced to the “extent the court thinks just and 
equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the loss or 
damage”.  
 
Given the dearth of authorities directly considering apportionment between claimant 
and respondent under the TPA, a court may seek guidance from decisions on similar 
provisions in state apportionment legislation.37 Despite obvious analogies between s 
82(1B) and comparable state apportionment legislation, a direct application of the 
authorities considering the respective responsibilities of a negligent wrongdoer and a 
careless claimant is unlikely. One area in which a difference is likely to appear 
concerns the question of whether a court having concluded the injured party’s conduct 
partly caused the loss, can apportion responsibility and therefore compensation with a 
                                                 
36  See for example, Hai Quan Global Smash Repairs v Ledabow Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1224. 
37  See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld); 
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA); Wrongs Act 1954 
(Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 
1947 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT). 
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negligible or 0% to the injured party? Again a situation in which a court may consider 
such an apportionment is where the only failure of the claimant is a failure to check 
the truth of the misleading statement. 
 
The discretion of the court under State Apportionment Legislation 
Exactly what circumstances are relevant to a just and equitable determination is not 
expressly detailed in the authorities, the High Court expressing the view that 
apportionment is a finding upon “a question, not of principle or of positive findings of 
fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of weighing 
different considerations”.38 These considerations will generally include a comparison 
of the culpability of the claimant and respondent and of the relative importance of the 
acts of the parties in causing the loss.39 A comparison of culpability requires a court to 
compare the degree of departure of each party from the standard of care of a 
reasonable person taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances and a 
comparison of causative effect is a question of fact. 
 
How will this translate to a consideration of apportionment under s 82(1B) and will 
the policy of the Act be a consideration taken into account? 
 
Discretion to apportion under the TPA 
The approach under the State apportionment legislation gives a court a wide 
discretion to make an apportionment that is just and equitable.40 It is probable that a 
court considering apportionment under the TPA will follow this approach, giving 
effect where possible to analogies that exist.  
 
First, the question of causative effect under s 82(1B) is likely to involve a factual 
investigation of the importance of the respective conduct of each party to the creation 
of the loss. It is unlikely that policy questions will be relevant to such a comparison.  
 
                                                 
38  Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529 at 532 quoting British Fame 
(Owners) v MacGregor (Owners) [1943] AC 197 at 210. 
39  Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10 at 16; Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd 
(1985) 59 ALR 529; Joslyn v Berryman (2002) 214 CLR 552; 198 ALR 137. 
40  Joslyn v Berryman (2002) 214 CLR 552 at [119]; 198 ALR 137. 
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In the case of the second factor of culpability, a court may face a significant hurdle in 
seeking to compare the culpability of each of the parties. Unlike negligence and 
contributory negligence a court will be comparing a breach of s 52 with a failure to 
take reasonable care. This will present difficulties and may, as already suggested, lead 
to no useful comparison.41 Resort to the policy of the TPA at this point may lead to 
the conclusion that as the purpose of the Act is to protect the consumer from a 
contravention of a particular standard of conduct; no apportionment for a failure to 
investigate the conduct should be made. While such a conclusion would frustrate the 
purpose of s 82(1B), it is clear that the fact the respondent has contravened s 52, as 
opposed to acting negligently, is a factor which the court would be entitled to weigh 
in determining apportionment.    
 
If this is an acceptable consideration, will there be circumstances, failing short of 
fraud, where the conduct of the respondent is so grave and the claimant’s failure to 
take care so trivial (although still causative) that a court may consider that 0% 
reduction in damages is just and equitable? This issue has arisen under the state 
apportionment legislation. The High Court in Wynbergen v Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd 
(1997) 149 ALR 25; 72 ALJR 65 (Wynbergen) held that a 100% apportionment of 
damage to one party was not possible as (at 29): 
 
… no matter how culpable the claimant may be, if the damage results from the 
fault of the person who suffers the damage and the fault of another, it is not 
possible to say that the damages recoverable in respect of that damage are to 
be not simply reduced but are to be entirely eliminated. Such an outcome 
cannot be justified as “just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share 
in the responsibility for the damage” for it is an outcome which holds the 
claimant wholly responsible, not partly so.  
 
This decision has been abrogated by most State civil liability legislation which now 
allows a reduction of a plaintiff’s damages of 100% to be made, effectively defeating 
the plaintiff’s claim.42  There is no equivalent provision in the TPA, leading to the 
                                                 
41  I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [59]; 192 ALR 1. 
42  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), 
s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 47. 
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question of whether the decision in Wynbergen (1997) 149 ALR 25; 72 ALJR 65 
presents a hurdle for a court considering apportionment under s 82(1B) due to the 
similarity of the drafting in s 82(1B) and the state legislation.  One justification for a 
0% apportionment open to a court seeking to disregard Wynbergen (1997) 149 ALR 
25; 72 ALJR 65 is that the consumer protection purpose of the Act provides a further 
consideration which the court may weigh.  One area in which policy considerations 
have influenced the court is in the apportionment of loss is between an auditor and 
their client. Although it is now possible for the client’s failure to take care to amount 
to contributory negligence,43 the High Court has expressed the view that a just and 
equitable finding may be that the “auditor bear all the damages despite the fault of the 
client”.44  This is in recognition of the fact the auditor owes a duty to the client to 
protect them from certain risks and loss, therefore making apportionment inequitable 
in some instances. 
 
Could there be circumstances under the TPA where it would be just and equitable for 
the respondent to bear all of the loss? In Hai Quan Global Smash Repairs v Ledabow 
Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1224 the claimant purchased a smash repair business from the 
respondent. The respondent made certain representations about turnover and the 
business. The respondent was an approved repairer for several insurance companies 
including NRMA. It was known by the respondent that the claimants were paying a 
price for the business predicated on the insurance work continuing at the same rate. 
The respondent knew and failed to tell the claimants that NRMA would cancel the 
existing agreement and require the claimants to reapply. It was obvious to the 
respondent that the claimants who had never operated a smash repairs business were 
naive about the operation of the business and insurance companies. Justice Madgwick 
held, after referring to accepted authorities,45 that the respondent engaged in 
misleading or deceptive conduct by silence. It was also clear on the facts that a 
significant amount of the loss incurred after entry into the business was as a result of 
                                                 
43  Prior to the decision in Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 it was accepted that 
contributory negligence could not arise where the breach of duty of a respondent was to protect the 
client from damage in respect of the very purpose of the duty. This approach was confirmed in Astley v 
Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1 at [29]; 161 ALR 155 in relation to solicitors. 
44  In Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1 at [28]; 161 ALR 155 citing Daniels v Anderson 
(1995) 37 NSWLR 438 at 568. 
45  Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31; Metalcorp Recyclers Pty Ltd v Metal 
Manufacturers Ltd [2003] NSWCA 213. 
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the incompetence of the claimants. Despite submissions by the respondent, Madgwick 
J refused to reduce the compensation because (at [73]): 
 
 There is no warrant, however, to reduce what they should receive, especially 
when the very evident fact of such managerial incapacity is one of the 
circumstances which made the respondent’s conduct misleading. 
 
Could this same result be justified after the introduction of s 82(1B)? Assuming in the 
first instance that the court concludes the loss was caused partly by the conduct of the 
claimant. After establishing causative effect, the court is required to reduce the 
compensation payable by an amount the court thinks just and equitable having regard 
to the responsibility of the claimant for the loss. At this point the court’s assessment 
of responsibility is likely to be influenced by factors such as the materiality of the 
misleading conduct to the entry into the contract, whether the claimant could have 
discovered the truth of the statement and whether the respondent took advantage of 
the inexperience of the claimant. The mind of a judge considering a case where the 
only failure of the claimant is to verify the statements of the respondent is likely to 
weigh as one of their considerations the policy of the Act. Clear and definite past 
statements likely to be given significant weight by a judge include McHugh J in Burke 
v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [66]; 187 ALR 612 (Burke):46 
  
… it is against the policy of the Trade Practices Act that a party, having been 
found to have breached s 52, could bind the very person who was misled and 
deceived to contribute to the loss; 
 
The alternative view expressed by the minority in I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 
109; 192 ALR 1 suggests that the principle of fairness to consumers can still be met 
provided the claimant receives compensation for the actual loss suffered. Therefore, 
where the court determines the claimant is the cause of some of the loss, fairness 
dictates a reduction should be made. Interestingly advocates of this view may find 
additional justification for their interpretative approach in the majority decision in 
I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1. The majority view that s 87 did not 
                                                 
46  See also I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [182]; 192 ALR 1 per Kirby J. 
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confer a discretionary power to modify s 82 was based on, amongst other things, the 
fact this conclusion was not expressly provided for in the Act. Likewise, in the case of 
apportionment between claimant and respondent it could be argued that the omission 
of this as an express right would indicate an intention, particularly in light of 
Wynbergen (1997) 149 ALR 25; 72 ALJR 65, that a 0% apportionment is not 
available. 
 
4. The New Dynamic – Proportionate Liability  
The introduction of proportionate liability creates a new dynamic within the remedial 
provisions of the TPA. The overall objective of proportionate liability is to ensure that 
those who are jointly or severally liable in respect of the “same loss or damage” are 
not exposed to paying for the whole of the loss caused, but are only required to 
compensate the injured party for the proportion of the loss that is relative to their 
culpability. This results in an obvious benefit to wrongdoers and their insurers who 
once their proportion of responsibility is determined cannot be required to contribute 
to the damages payable by another “concurrent wrongdoer” in the claim.   
Theoretically, the proportioning of loss between co-respondents should not impact on 
the policy of ensuring an injured party receives the whole of the loss suffered by 
awarding compensation under s 82. When examined more closely, however, the 
drafting of the proportionate liability provisions47 expose a potential threat to the 
underlying policy of the TPA, by shifting the risk of recovery of compensation 
awarded from the wrongdoers to the claimant. The obvious example is where the 
wrongdoer is in liquidation, insolvent or deceased. Section 87CB(5) requires the 
culpability of these wrongdoers to be taken into account in determining the relative 
contributions of the parties. This has the immediate potential to generate conflict 
between the underlying policy of ensuring injured parties receive the whole of their 
loss and the economically motivated desire of the government to limit the exposure of 
wrongdoers and their insurers.48 In light of this potential conflict it is proposed to 
consider how the consumer protection purpose of the Act may be accommodated in 
the interpretation of the proportionate liability provision. For the purposes of 
examining the proportionate liability provisions we will highlight interpretative and 
                                                 
47  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 87CB-87CI. 
48  Refer to the objectives of CLERP in Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 at [4.100].  
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policy conflicts by utilising facts similar to Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 
37 as a case study.   
 
A case study 
In a property transaction a buyer may prior to buying the property rely on the 
representations of a corporate real estate agent, a corporate accountant and advice 
from their solicitor about the property. Assume that each professional engages in 
misleading conduct on different topics all of which contribute to the loss of the 
claimant. The real estate agent makes a representation about future development 
potential of the property including the likely sale price of the units, the accountant 
incorrectly prepares a feasibility study detailing the cost of the development at much 
lower than the real cost and the solicitor negligently advises the buyer that 
development approval for a 10 storey building is possible when in fact only seven 
storeys will be approved. All of these representations impact on the buyer’s decision 
and the evidence shows that in the case of each that if the truth was told the buyer 
would not have purchased the property. By the time the matter is litigated the 
accountant is in liquidation. The court concludes that the real estate agent and the 
accountant have contravened s 52 of the Act and are liable to compensate the buyer 
under s 82. The solicitor is found to be negligent and liable to compensate the buyer 
in negligence. The claim against the solicitor under s 52 does not succeed as the 
solicitor is not a corporation even though the solicitor’s conduct was considered 
misleading. 
 
Obviously any application of the proportionate liability provisions to this situation 
will disadvantage the buyer, who will be unable to recover the whole of the loss due 
to the insolvency of the accountant.  Is there scope for the consumer protection policy 
of the Act to minimise the impact of proportionate liability on the injured party in this 
situation? The commonality of terms used in s 82(1B), s 87CB and s 87CC, 
particularly in relation to the threshold requirement for application of the provisions, 
may result in consumer protection policy having a greater influence than first 
assumed. The particular areas in which consumer protection policy may influence the 
operation of proportionate liability will be considered in the context of the case study. 
Three issues arise for consideration: 
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1. Are the respondents “concurrent wrongdoers”? 
2. Is this an “apportionable claim”? 
3. Factors relevant to the apportionment of responsibility 
 
4.1 “Concurrent Wrongdoer” 
The first inquiry likely to be made by a court is whether the wrongdoers are 
“concurrent wrongdoers” under s 87CB(3).  A concurrent wrongdoer will be a person 
“who is one or 2 or more persons whose acts or omissions caused, independently of 
each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim”.  The only 
point of relevance in the definition is that the person must cause with others the loss 
of the claimant. In the case study each of the participants would come within the 
definition of concurrent wrongdoer. If the operation of the provision are to be limited 
the court will do this, it is suggested, through the exclusionary provisions or the scope 
of “apportionable claim”. 
 
The first basis upon which a court may limit the operation of the provisions is by 
giving broad scope to s 87CC which excludes from the benefit of the proportionate 
liability provisions those wrongdoers who intentionally or fraudulently cause loss.49 
An excluded wrongdoer’s liability will be decided in accordance with the legal rules 
normally applying. Therefore, where the liability falls under the TPA this means the 
excluded wrongdoer will be jointly and severally liable for the whole of the loss. 
Consequently, the plaintiff may seek 100% of the judgment from this wrongdoer who 
in turn would not be entitled to seek contribution from any other wrongdoers unless 
the equitable principle of coordinate liability is applicable.50  
 
While a desire to give effect to the fundamental notion of contribution51 and the stated 
economic policy of the apportionment legislation to reduce the exposure of 
wrongdoers and their insurers could point to a narrow operation for the exclusionary 
provisions, the use of the same provision to restrict the operation of s 82(1B) 
introduces a hurdle for that approach.  As exactly the same exclusionary provision 
                                                 
49  This person will be referred to as an excluded wrongdoer. 
50  Other than the power to apportion provided by this new Part, there is no power to apportion 
loss or attribute contribution for loss or damage arising under the TPA. The lack of jurisdiction 
to apportion loss generally for a contravention of the TPA is discussed extensively in Burke 
(2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612. 
51  Alexander (2004) 216 CLR 109 at [69]; 204 ALR 417 per Kirby J. 
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exists in s 82(1B)(c) and s 87CC it is difficult to see how a court could justify giving a 
different operation to the requirements in s 87CC as compared to s 82(1B)(c).  
By default this will introduce consumer protection policy to a consideration of 
excluded wrongdoers under s 87CC. 
 
As previously discussed in relation to s 82(1B), a court is likely to adopt common law 
concepts of intent and fraud given the strong parallels drawn in the past to claims 
under s 82 and compensation for deceit.52 The consumer protection policy of the Act 
is likely to influence a broad view of fraud and intent encompassing most cases of 
misleading conduct by silence. A conclusion to this effect not only increases the 
circumstances in which the compensation to the plaintiff is not reduced but also 
impacts on the pool of wrongdoers able to limit their liability through application of 
the proportionate liability provisions.   
 
4.2 “Apportionable Claim” 
Central to an application of the proportionate liability provisions is the concept of an 
apportionable claim. An apportionable claim is defined in s 87CB(1) as a claim for 
compensation under s 82 for a contravention of s 52 involving economic loss or 
property damage. The operation of the definition is further clarified in s 87CB(2) 
which provides that a single apportionable claim will exist in respect of the same loss 
or damage even if the claim for the loss or damage is based on more than one cause of 
action (whether or not of the same or a different kind). 
 
Will the operation of s 87CB(1) be influenced by the interpretation of s 82(1B)? 
 
Given the commonality of drafting it is difficult to foresee how a court will be able to 
justify giving a different operation to the requirements in s 87CB(1) as compared to s 
82(1B). As previously suggested a strict and literal interpretation of the requirement 
in s 82(1B) for a claim under s 52 for compensation under s 82 is the most likely 
outcome. In the context of the proportionate liability provisions this is an outcome 
which will limit the operation of the provisions and is consistent with the consumer 
protection policy of the Act. The necessity for consistency in meaning of similar 
                                                 
52  Henville (2001) 206 CLR 459 at [135]; 182 ALR 37. 
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terminology and provisions of the Act militate against a broader view of s 87CB(1). Is 
there scope for further limiting the meaning of apportionable claim due to the 
insertion of s 87CB(2)?  
 
Will an apportionable claim be limited to the “same loss and damage”? 
 
Section 87CB(2) appears to clarify that an apportionable claim can still exist even 
though several claims for compensation based on alternative causes of action have 
been brought. In the case study example for instance, a claimant is likely to allege 
both misleading conduct and negligent misrepresentation against the real estate and 
accountant as justifying the compensation sought.  An opportunity to further limit the 
meaning of apportionable claim arises in a consideration of the following: 
 
• Where alternative claims are alleged does the section require the court to find 
the contravention of s 52 by each wrongdoer caused loss or damage to the 
claimant?  
• Does the loss and damage caused by each wrongdoer need to be the “same 
loss and damage”? 
• If one of the wrongdoers has contributed to the same loss through negligence 
and not misleading conduct (this will generally apply to the lawyer in the 
above example who is not usually caught by the operation of the TPA) will the 
provisions apply? 
 
Previous TPA decisions provide little guidance as it was consistently accepted that the 
TPA itself did not empower a court to apportion loss or grant claims for contribution 
as between joint and several wrongdoers53 and the use of s 87 of the Act as a back 
door avenue to apportionment was consistently refused.54  Outside of the TPA it is 
clear that apportionment provisions in other legislation have not always been given a 
broad operation. This is evident in the High Court’s consideration of s 23B of the 
                                                 
53  Australian Breeders Co-operative Society Ltd v Jones (1997) ACLC 100 at 150; 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White [1999] 2 VR 681; Jonstan Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2003] NSWSC 
500; cf Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 265 at 
277; Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1 at 11; Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [99]; 187 ALR 612 
per Kirby J. 
54  Re La Rosa; ex parte Norgard v Rodpat Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 83 at 87-89; Lezam 
Pty Ltd v Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 535; Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd 
(No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382; Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1. 
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Victorian Wrongs Act 1958 in Alexander (t/as Minter Ellison Ltd) v Perpetual 
Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; 204 ALR 417 (Alexander) where the majority 
of the court, (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ)55 gave the distributive justice 
policy of the Act a narrow construction. In the Honour’s view the requirement for 
liability to be “in respect of the same damage” implied a common liability in respect 
of the same breaches of trust was required.56  It was stated at [27]: 
 
… the statutory creation of rights of contribution between the wrongdoers 
seeks to address the injustice that may result in some cases if the victim, by his 
or her selection of respondent, could throw the burden of liability on to one or 
some of the wrongdoers, to the exclusion of the others. A policy of preventing 
or limited such injustice will require a legislature to make choices between 
different methods of giving effect to that policy. Those choices will be 
reflected in the terms of the legislation. …. In resolving questions of 
construction of the legislation it is not to be assumed that the legislative 
purpose is always to provide the widest possible sharing of liability, actual or 
potential, real or hypothetical. 
 
Adoption of a similar approach would result in the interpretation of the proportionate 
liability provisions being influenced more by the overall consumer protection policy 
of the legislation and less by the legislative purpose of introducing proportionate 
liability. A decision to give a restrictive meaning to “same loss and damage” would 
result in a court limiting the operation of the provisions to situations where the 
evidence proves that each concurrent wrongdoer caused through a contravention of s 
52, as opposed to contravention of a different section or a common law obligation, the 
same type (ie economic or property) of loss and damage to the claimant.  
 
What is the impact on the case study example of this approach? First the liability of 
the solicitor would be excluded as although possibly contributing to the same loss, the 
solicitor did not cause the loss through a contravention of s 52. Absent the application 
of any State apportionment legislation, the solicitor will be jointly and severally 
                                                 
55  The decision of the High Court was split 3:3. 
56  This bears hallmarks of the majority decision in Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612 
where the principle of co-ordinate liability was strictly interpreted as applying to situations where the 
obligations breached are truly common to the parties. 
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liable. Secondly, the court would need to inquire as to whether the contraventions of s 
52 by the real estate agent and the accountant caused the same loss. Guidance on this 
point was obtained by the majority in Alexander (2004) 216 CLR 109; 204 ALR 417 
from the English decision of Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] 
1 WLR 1397, where the House of Lords held that a claim against a builder for 
damages for delay in completion was not the “same loss” as a concurrent claim 
against the architect for the impairment of its ability to proceed against the builder. 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill described that phrase as emphasising the need, which was 
“a constant theme of the law of contribution”, for the “one loss to be apportioned 
among those liable” (at 1397). At a broad level the real estate agent and accountant 
have contributed to the purchase and subsequent loss, being the loss of profit on the 
property and the expensed incurred, albeit in differing proportions. However, a strict 
and literal approach to the meaning of “same loss and damage” may result in a court 
distinguishing between economic loss and property damage or between different types 
of economic loss.  
 
Clearly the adoption of an approach similar to the majority in Alexander (2004) 216 
CLR 109; 204 ALR 417 is consistent with the overall policy of the TPA as it aids in 
the restriction of situations in which an injured party may not be able to recover the 
whole of their loss. The approach may however be criticised as failing to give 
appropriate effect to the clear objective of the legislature “to place downward pressure 
on professional indemnity insurance premiums”57 by limiting the amount that may be 
recovered from each wrongdoer to the amount of the loss for which that party is 
responsible. Is there support for consumer protection policy to be minimised and 
proportionate liability to have a broader operation? 
 
The minority of McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ in Alexander (2004) 216 CLR 109; 
204 ALR 417 favoured a flexible approach to apportionment, giving broad effect to 
the policies of justice and equity underlying the notion of contribution and called 
strongly for disregarding any technical approach to contribution. As articulated by 
Kirby J (at [69] citing Mahoney v McManus (1981) 180 CLR 370 at 378 per Gibbs 
CJ): 
                                                 
57  Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 at [4.110]. 
 31
 
Where the acts or omissions of a number of parties contribute to the damage 
suffered by another, a rational system of law would provide a means by which 
those responsible for such damage were obliged to share the burden as 
between each other in a just and equitable way, having regard to the extent of 
their respective responsibilities for the damage. The apportionment might not 
be capable of being performed with scientific precision because of the 
diversity of the several responsibilities and the scope for different assessments 
of the requirements of justice and equity in the case. But the fundamental 
notion of contribution is a simple one. In an ideal world it would not be 
“defeated by too technical an approach”. 
 
If a broad approach to responsibility between concurrent wrongdoers is adopted 
without reference to the consumer protection policy of the Act, Kirby J’s approach 
suggests that as all of the wrongdoers have in some way contributed to the purchase 
of the property and the suffering of the loss, each should be required to contribute in 
just and equitable shares to payment of compensation. Such a result is undoubtedly 
just and equitable as between the wrongdoers but, a comparison of the decisions of 
Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612 and Alexander (2004) 216 CLR 109; 204 
ALR 417 reveal that a broader natural justice approach may end up giving way to the 
consumer protection policy of the TPA. Two members of the minority in Alexander 
(2004) 216 CLR 109; 204 ALR 417 who advocated an approach similar to Kirby J, 
when faced with the policy considerations of the TPA were influenced to join the 
majority in Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [66]; 187 ALR 612 in refusing contribution. 
A balance may be achieved however between the two competing policies by the 
following approach: 
 
1. Proportionate liability should only be available between concurrent 
wrongdoers who have clearly contravened s 52 (whether other statutory or 
common law obligations are breached or not). 
2. Only claims for compensation under s 82 should attract proportionate liability. 
Claims under s 87 should not be included. 
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3. A broad view of the exclusionary provisions to exclude wrongdoers who 
intentionally or fraudulent mislead the claimant thereby causing loss should be 
applied. 
4. Evidence should be required to prove that each contravention of s 52 
contributed to or caused loss to the claimant. 
5. Where the loss suffered by the claimant is either economic loss or property 
damages (or both), provided the concurrent wrongdoer has caused some part 
of that loss, the court should be entitled to apportion liability with other 
wrongdoers. 
 
The first three propositions limit the initial operation of the proportionate liability 
provisions consistently with the operation of s 82(1B) and adopt, it is suggested, the 
likely approach of a court focussed on the consumer protection objectives of the Act. 
The second two propositions give effect to broader notions of contribution favoured 
by the minority in Alexander (2004) 216 CLR 109; 204 ALR 417 as well as being 
consistent with the legislative intent of the provisions.  
 
4.3 Determining a just proportion of responsibility for loss 
The final area in which proportionate liability may conflict with consumer protection 
policy is in the exercise of the court’s discretion to determine the proportions in which 
each party should bear the loss. A significant issue for resolution is whether the 
placement of proportionate liability within a statutory regime so clearly grounded in 
consumer protection policies will impact on how a court exercises its discretion. Like 
s 82(1B) there are no specific guidelines or restrictions on the court’s discretion to 
apportion loss other than the fact the court may apportion as it considers “just having 
regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss”.  Read in 
light of the legislative purpose, s 87CD clearly indicates that the court’s discretion 
should focus on the making of a “just” determination as between the wrongdoers. To 
what extent can and should the court have regard to the overall purpose of consumer 
protection in making this determination? 
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As the apportionment of loss in the context of claims under the TPA is a new 
concept58 a court is likely in the first instance to have resort to the approach taken 
under State legislation, which in similar terms to s 87CD allows for contribution 
between tortfeasors in the shares the court considers “just and equitable having regard 
to the extent of each tortfeasor’s responsibility for the loss”.59 Where the court is 
assessing the relative responsibilities of two tortfeasors it is accepted that the court 
will generally consider the relative causal potency of each tortfeasors’ acts and the 
degree of departure by each from the standard of conduct required. Where both 
tortfeasors have been negligent greater importance is generally given to the degree to 
which one tortfeasor’s conduct falls below the standard expected.60 Where however, 
the tortfeasors have both committed the breach of a strict statutory duty and degrees 
of departure from the duty are therefore irrelevant, the primary determining criteria is 
the causative effect of the conduct of each.61 A parallel can be drawn between this 
second situation and liability for misleading conduct. Liability for misleading conduct 
is considered “strict” liability as intention to mislead is not required.62 It is not 
possible to establish different degrees of misleading conduct although deceptive as 
opposed to misleading conduct may produce a difference in culpability. Wrongdoers 
who engage in fraudulent or intentional conduct are excluded from the operation of 
the provisions in any event. 
 
What guidance can be drawn from previous authorities in relation to determining 
responsibility for loss arising from strict liability? In Fatur v IC Formwork Pty Ltd 
(2000) 155 FLR 70 Miles CJ considered the liability of two tortfeasors liable for a 
contravention of (2) of the Regulations under the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912 
(NSW). His Honour was unable to draw any guidance from past decisions. After 
establishing that the statute did not distinguish “between degrees of duty to provide 
                                                 
58  Although for one case in which an apportionment was undertaken by reference to s23B of the 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), see Bailkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 154 ALR 534. 
59  Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s5(2); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 
7; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), ss6(5) and (7); 
Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(2); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence 
and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(2); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(2); Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), 17(2). 
60  Dare v Dobson [1960] SR (NSW) 474; Covacevich v Thomson (1988) Aust Torts Reports 80-
153; Nikolic v Commonwealth Accommodation & Catering Service Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 413. 
61  Fatur v IC Formwork Pty Ltd (2000) 155 FLR 70 at [48]. 
62  Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 197; Yorke v 
Lucas (19085) 158 CLR 661 at 666. 
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safe means of access on the part of persons who carry out the building work” his 
Honour concluded that (at [48]): 
 
In the absence of any guidance in the statute or from judicial authority or 
practice or any particular factor to which counsel was able to draw attention, it 
seems to me that where two tortfeasors are both guilty of a breach of statutory 
duty, or at least a breach of the absolute duty imposed by reg 73(2), then the 
only way contribution may be apportioned between them is that each should 
bear 50 percent of the liability. 
 
In reaching this decision his Honour did not discuss in any detail the relative causal 
effect of each party’s actions. This decision suggests therefore, that where the statute 
itself does not distinguish between degrees of fault it will be difficult for the court to 
apportion other than on a 50:50 basis. Is this an approach suitable for the TPA? In the 
writers’ view several factors mitigate against this approach.  
 
First, under the TPA, although there is only one standard for misleading conduct 
courts have in the past awarded differential contributions between parties who have 
contravened s 52.63 Although little guidance is given on how such an apportionment 
was reached in those cases factors such as which wrongdoer was the primary source 
of the misleading information,64 did the other wrongdoer reasonably fail to check this 
information before providing it to the claimant65 and will one of the wrongdoers 
obtain a benefit from their misleading conduct if contribution is awarded66 were 
considered relevant. Secondly, apportionment merely on an equal basis would defeat 
to an extent the object of introducing proportionate liability which is to limit the 
liability of a wrongdoer to their responsibility for the loss and may not be just as 
between the parties. Therefore, despite the fact the standard of conduct required by s 
52 is an absolute, the past authorities and the legislative purpose of the new provisions 
                                                 
63  Lawson Hill Estate Pty Ltd v Tovegold Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1593 where the court apportioned 
between a real estate agent and two sellers of a property in the proportions of 10%, 65% and 25% 
respectively.  
64  Bailkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 154 ALR 534 the wrongdoer who provided the information to 
their agent for publication was considered to be 75% responsible. 
65  Bailkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 154 ALR 534 the agent was considered partly to blame for 
failing to following the instructions of the principal prior to publication. 
66  Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612 where the court considered the claimant would 
actually benefit if the solicitor for the buyer was required to contribute to the compensation. 
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clearly indicate a differential apportionment on the basis of causation and other 
discretionary factors is more likely. Will one of those factors extend to the overall 
consumer protection policy of the Act? 
 
Very little guidance on the discretionary factors likely to impact on a court decision to 
apportion between wrongdoers exists, with judges67 and commentators68 alike noting 
that judicial explanation of the discretion to apportion (even for negligence) is scarce 
and “should be dealt with broadly and upon common sense principles”.69 The cloak of 
mystery surrounding the factors a court will consider relevant provides significant 
latitude to a court concerned for the welfare of the claimant to justify an assessment 
by reference not only to the causative impact of the conduct but also to the consumer 
protection policy of the Act. Precedent for broadening the scope of a court’s 
assessment under the TPA appears in Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [66]; 187 ALR 
612 where a claim for contribution was refused by reason of the fact it was:  
 
inconsistent with the policy consideration behind the enactment of Pts V and 
VI of the Trade Practices Act. It would enable a person in breach of s 52 of 
the Act to profit by its contravention of the Act.  
 
Other members of the court also referred to other factors such as “culpability, 
causation and notions of unjust enrichment”70 being appropriate for inclusion in the 
assessment matrix. While the facts of Burke (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612 
present an unusual situation where one of the wrongdoers was also mislead by the 
conduct of the other, it highlights the willingness of the High Court to refer to and use 
the policy of the Act, particularly when faced with a difficult decision, as a 
justification for deciding a question of apportionment.  
 
                                                 
67  Fatur v IC Formwork Pty Ltd (2000) 155 FLR 70 at [48] although his Honour noted that the 
subject was touched on by a Full Court of the Federal Court in Nominal Defendant v Australian Capital 
Territory [1999] FCA 446 and in a report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Contribution 
between Persons Liability for the Same Damage, Report 89 and Richardson M, Economics of Joint and 
Several Liability versus Proportionate Liability, Victorian Attorney-General’s Law Reform Advisory 
Council, Expert Report 3, 1998 at 90-91. 
68  Fleming, n 19, p 298. 
69  The Volute [1922] 1 AC 129 at 144. 
70  (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [22], [119]. 
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Whether this approach will justify an apportionment of 0% to one of the wrongdoers 
is unclear. As discussed above the decision of Wynbergen (1997) 149 ALR 25; 72 
ALJR 65 suggests that the allocation of 0% to one wrongdoer is not “just and 
equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage” 
for it is an outcome which holds the claimant wholly responsible, not partly so (at 29). 
While the effect of this decision has been abrogated by most State civil liability 
legislation in relation to apportionment between claimant and wrongdoer71 there is no 
equivalent provision in the TPA. McDonald72 suggests that the similarity of the 
drafting in s 87CD and the State legislation means that Wynbergen (1997) 149 ALR 
25; 72 ALJR 65 presents a significant hurdle for any justification of a just and 
equitable apportionment of 0% to a wrongdoer where a causative link between their 
conduct and the loss is found. The decision of NBD Bank v South Italy Titling SA 
[1997] SADC 3596 however, under the proportionate liability provisions of the 
Development Act 1993 (SA),73 suggests that where the loss caused by one of the 
wrongdoers is insignificant when compared to the others, a just and equitable result 
may justify an apportionment of 100% to one wrongdoer. This conclusion was 
reached in that case despite the fact each wrongdoer caused some of the loss. In the 
writers’ view the chance of a similar result under the TPA proportionate liability 
provisions is probable given the likelihood of the policy of the Act entering the 
consciousness of judges when exercising their discretion.  However, given the past 
lack of guidance about how the power of apportionment is exercised, verification of 
this view together with a clear picture of the factors relevant to a court’s 
determination of apportionment under the TPA is unlikely to appear for some time. 
 
5. Conclusions 
It is clear that the policy of the TPA plays a significant role in its interpretation and no 
doubt will continue to do so.  Despite the clear consumer protection purpose of the 
Act different remedial outcomes are still possible, as evidenced by the decision in I&L 
Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1where both  the majority and the minority 
                                                 
71  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), 
s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 47. 
72  McDonald, n 14.  
73  This Act removes the doctrine of joint and several liability for liability in relation to building work. 
Similar Act existed in other States prior to the civil liability legislation: Building Act 1993 (Vic); 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW); Building Act 1996 (NT). 
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purported to base their decision upon consumer protection only to arrive at opposing 
conclusions.  As McHugh J has stated: 74 
 
Questions of construction are notorious for generating opposing answers, none 
of which can be said to be either clearly right or clearly wrong. Frequently, 
there is simply no “right” answer to a question of construction. 
 
A court intent on protecting an injured party’s claim to the whole of the loss suffered 
will face difficulties in justifying this approach given the drafting of s 82(1B) and the 
proportionate liability provisions.  By introducing the ability to apportion between 
claimant and wrongdoer it is arguably the intention of the Parliament that a 
respondent in breach of s 52 is not to be placed in the role of insurer of all loss.  But 
as noted by Kirby J in I&L Securities (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [178]; 192 ALR 1, “the 
mind of a judge naturally searches for an alternative construction that avoids such an 
affront to justice”.  While the exact interaction of the consumer protection policy of 
the Act with the new legislative intention to distribute liability for loss on the basis of 
responsibility is not certain, it is clear that judges desiring to continue awards to 
consumers for the whole of their loss have will find sufficient grounds within the 
policy of the Act to maintain that position in a significant number of cases.  
 
 
                                                 
74  News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2003) 215 CLR 563 at [42]; 
200 ALR 157. 
